How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset-Price Bubbles? by Gruen, David et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How Should Monetary Policy Respond to
Asset-Price Bubbles?
David Gruen and Michael Plumb and Andrew Stone
24. May 2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/833/
MPRA Paper No. 833, posted 21. November 2006
How Should Monetary Policy Respond to
Asset-Price Bubbles?∗
David Gruen
Australian Treasury
Michael Plumb and Andrew Stone
Reserve Bank of Australia
We present a simple macroeconomic model that includes
a role for an asset-price bubble. We then derive optimal
monetary policy settings for two policymakers: a skeptic, for
whom the best forecast of future asset prices is the current
price; and an activist, whose policy recommendations take
into account the complete stochastic implications of the
bubble. We show that the activist’s recommendations depend
sensitively on the detailed stochastic properties of the bubble.
In some circumstances the activist clearly recommends
tighter policy than the skeptic, but in others the appropriate
recommendation is to be looser. Our results highlight the
stringent informational requirements inherent in an activist
policy approach to handling asset-price bubbles.
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Asset-price bubbles pose diﬃcult problems for monetary policy,
and despite considerable debate, no consensus has yet emerged on
the appropriate strategy for monetary policymakers in the presence
of such bubbles.
Diﬀerent views about the appropriate role of monetary pol-
icy in the presence of asset-price bubbles do not arise primarily
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because of diﬀerences about the objectives of monetary policy. These
objectives, it is usually agreed, are to maintain low inﬂation and
to limit the volatility of inﬂation and output, thereby contribut-
ing to stability in both the macroeconomy and the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. Rather, the diﬀerent views are about how best to achieve these
objectives.
One view is that monetary policy should do no more than follow
the standard precepts of inﬂation targeting. Proponents of this view
would acknowledge that rising asset prices often have expansionary
eﬀects on the economy, and might sometimes also provide a signal for
incipient inﬂationary pressures, so that some tightening of monetary
policy might be appropriate. According to this view, however, policy
should only respond to observed changes in asset prices to the extent
that they signal current or future changes to inﬂation or the output
gap. There should be no attempt to use policy either to gently lean
against a suspected asset-price bubble while it is growing or, more
aggressively, to try to burst it. This view of the appropriate monetary
policy response to asset-price bubbles has been put forth recently by
Bernanke (2002).
An alternative view is that monetary policy should aim to
do more than respond to actual and expected developments in
inﬂation and the output gap. Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani
(2003), prominent proponents of this alternative view, put the argu-
ment in these terms:
Central banks seeking to smooth output and inﬂation
ﬂuctuations can improve . . .macroeconomic outcomes by
setting interest rates with an eye toward asset prices
in general, and misalignments in particular . . .Raising
interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above what
are estimated to be warranted levels, and lowering
interest rates modestly when asset prices fall below war-
ranted levels, will tend to oﬀset the impact on output
and inﬂation of [asset-price] bubbles, thereby enhancing
overall macroeconomic stability. In addition, if it were
known that monetary policy would act to “lean against
the wind” in this way, it might reduce the probabil-
ity of bubbles arising at all, which would also be a
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contribution to greater macroeconomic stability. (p. 429,
italics added)1
We argue here that it is not clear that central banks should follow
this advice. There is no universally optimal response to bubbles, and
the case for responding to a particular asset-price bubble depends
on the speciﬁc characteristics of the bubble process.
We present a simple model of the macroeconomy that includes
a role for an asset-price bubble, and derive optimal monetary
policy settings for two policymakers. The ﬁrst policymaker, a skeptic,
believes in the eﬃcient markets hypothesis and makes no attempt to
forecast future movements in asset prices when setting policy. His
policy settings deﬁne the standard inﬂation-targeting benchmark in
our model. The second policymaker, an activist, believes in the ex-
istence of the bubble and takes into account the complete stochastic
implications of the bubble when setting policy.
Once the bubble has formed, it is assumed to either grow each
year with some probability, or to collapse and disappear. Crucially,
and realistically, monetary policy in the model aﬀects the economy
with a lag, so that policy set today has its initial impact on the
economy next year, by which time the bubble will have either grown
further or collapsed.
For an activist policymaker, it follows that there are two coun-
tervailing inﬂuences on monetary policy in the presence of the bub-
ble. On the one hand, policy should be tighter than the standard
inﬂation-targeting benchmark to counter the expansionary eﬀects of
future expected growth in the bubble and, in some formulations, to
raise the probability that the bubble will burst. On the other hand,
policy should be looser to prepare the economy for the possibility
that the bubble may have burst by the time policy is having its
impact on the economy.
Which of these two inﬂuences dominates? For intermediate and
larger bubbles—which are of most importance to policymakers—we
1Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani are careful to argue that monetary policy
should not target asset prices. To quote them again, “we are not advocating that
asset prices should be targets for monetary policy, neither in the conventional
sense that they belong in the objective function of the central bank, nor in the
sense that they should be included in the inﬂation measure targeted by monetary
authorities” (p. 429, italics in the original).
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argue that it depends on the characteristics of the bubble process.
There are circumstances in which the activist should recommend
tighter policy than the skeptic. This is likely to be the appropriate
activist advice when one or more of the following conditions applies:
the probability that the bubble will burst of its own accord over
the next year is assessed to be small; the bubble’s probability of
bursting is quite interest sensitive; eﬃciency losses associated with
the bubble rise strongly with the bubble’s size; or the bubble’s demise
is expected to occur gradually over an extended period, rather than
in a sudden bust.
Alternatively, however, when these conditions do not apply, it is
more likely that the activist should recommend looser policy than
the skeptic. This result makes clear that there is no single optimal
rule for responding to all bubbles, and also illustrates the high level
of knowledge of the future stochastic properties of the bubble that
is required to determine even the appropriate direction of activist
policy.
1. Model
Our starting point is a simple, reduced-form model of the
macroeconomy, which nevertheless captures the key stylized features
of the interaction between monetary policy, output, and inﬂation.
Augmented with an asset-price bubble, the model is deliberately
illustrative rather than structural. It is designed to highlight the
intuition behind our results, while ensuring that the insights that
these results oﬀer into the debate surrounding the appropriate
response of monetary policy to asset-price bubbles are not obscured
by modeling technicalities.
That said, many of the properties of the reduced-form model
we outline below are qualitatively consistent with those of the
structural model developed by Bernanke and Gertler (2000), while
allowing for endogeneity of the bubble process. For example, mone-
tary policy aﬀects real activity with a lag, inﬂation has a backward-
looking element, and nonfundamental movements in asset prices
inﬂuence real activity. Furthermore, asset-price bubbles need not
be “rational” in the sense of Blanchard and Watson (1982), with
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the potential for supranormal returns as long as the bubble sur-
vives.2
Formally, our model is an extension of a simple closed-economy
model due to Ball (1999a) and Svensson (1997). In the Ball-Svensson
model, the economy is described by two equations:
yt = −βrt−1 + λyt−1 (1)
πt = πt−1 + αyt−1, (2)
where y is the output gap, r is the diﬀerence between the real interest
rate and its neutral level, π is the diﬀerence between consumer-price
inﬂation and its targeted rate, and α, β, and λ are positive constants
(with λ < 1 so that output gaps gradually return to zero).
The Ball-Svensson model has the advantage of simplicity and
intuitive appeal. It makes the simplifying assumption that policy-
makers control the real interest rate, rather than the nominal one. It
assumes, realistically, that monetary policy aﬀects real output, and
hence the output gap, with a lag, and that the output gap aﬀects
inﬂation with a further lag. The values for the parameters α, β, and
λ that Ball chose for the model, and that we will also use here, imply
that each period in the model is a year in length.3
We augment the model with an asset-price bubble. We assume
that in year 0, the economy is in equilibrium, with both output and
inﬂation at their target values, y0 = π0 = 0, and that the bubble has
zero size, a0 = 0. In subsequent years, we assume that the bubble
2Our model can also be thought of as extending the earlier approach of Kent
and Lowe (1997), by allowing for analysis of the appropriate response of monetary
policy to endogenous bubbles over a multiperiod horizon. A detailed comparison
of our results with those of Kent and Lowe is provided in appendix B of Gruen,
Plumb, and Stone (2003). For a more extended discussion of the issue of the
“rationality” of the asset-price bubbles we examine, see also section 2.2.5 below.
3Ball chose parameter values α = 0.4, β = 1, and λ = 0.8 to ﬁt the U.S.
economy, based on previous studies by Ball (1994), DeLong and Summers (1988),
and Rudebusch (1995). Ball (1999b) also used these parameter values in an open-
economy version of the model which he noted was “meant to apply to medium-to-
small open economies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand” (although an
increase in the real interest rate, for example, aﬀects output through two channels
in this open-economy model—directly and via the exchange rate—rather than
just via the former channel). Finally, Ball and Svensson also add white-noise
shocks to each of their equations, which we have suppressed for simplicity.
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evolves as follows:
at =


at−1 + γt, with probability 1− pt
0, with probability pt .
(3)
Thus, in each year, the bubble either grows by an amount, γt > 0,
or bursts and collapses back to zero. For ease of exposition, in the
rest of this section we will assume that γt is constant, γt = γ, but
we will allow for a range of alternative possibilities in the results we
report in the next section. We also assume that once the bubble has
burst, it does not re-form. To allow for the eﬀect of the bubble on
the economy, we modify the Ball-Svensson two-equation model to
read:
yt = −βrt−1 + λyt−1 +∆at (4)
πt = πt−1 + αyt−1 . (5)
In each year that the bubble is growing, it has an expansionary
eﬀect on the economy, increasing the level of output, and the output
gap, by γ. The bubble is, however, assumed to have no direct eﬀect
on consumer-price inﬂation, although there will be consequences for
inﬂation to the extent that the bubble leads the economy to operate
with excess demand as it expands, and with excess supply when it
bursts.
When the bubble bursts, the eﬀect on the economy is, of course,
contractionary—if the bubble bursts in year t, the direct eﬀect on
output, and the output gap, in that year will be ∆at = −(t − 1)γ.
Thus, the longer the bubble survives, the greater will be the contrac-
tionary eﬀect on the economy when it bursts.
We will assume that the evolution of the economy can be de-
scribed by this simple three-equation system (equations [3], [4], and
[5]). Before continuing, it is worth remarking on a number of aspects
of this system.
The most notable feature of equations (3), (4), and (5) is that
the treatment of both the asset-price bubble and the structure of the
economy is extremely simple and stylized. For example, the model
allows for no forward-looking element in the formation of inﬂation
expectations, therefore limiting the scope for monetary policy to in-
ﬂuence the economy through precommitment to a particular mone-
tary policy path. Furthermore, the asset-price bubble in the model
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is treated in a simple, reduced-form fashion, in terms of its impact
on real activity, without any attempt to model the bubble formation
process itself.
These choices are deliberate. They reﬂect that much of the discus-
sion about how monetary policy should react to asset-price bubbles
focuses on the extreme informational diﬃculties that policymakers
face in determining the properties of a given bubble (current size,
likelihood of collapse, impact on the real economy) or whether a
bubble even exists. These informational diﬃculties are often cited as
a principal reason why an activist approach to monetary policy in
the face of asset-price misalignments might be diﬃcult or suboptimal
in practice.
By using a highly simpliﬁed model of the economy, however, in
which policymakers are also endowed with full knowledge of the
stochastic properties of a developing asset-price bubble, it is pos-
sible to abstract from these informational issues. Doing so allows us
to explore whether there may be other factors, besides informational
constraints, which complicate an approach of actively responding to
asset-price bubbles—to the point of sometimes making it problem-
atic even to know whether policy ought to be set more tightly or
more loosely than it would otherwise be.
In this spirit, for example, the reason that we do not attempt
to provide a more explicit or detailed model of asset prices in this
paper is simply that doing so is not a focus of the paper. Rather,
we wish to study whether or not it is clear cut in what way policy-
makers ought to react to a developing asset-price bubble, even when
in possession of an understanding of the stochastic properties of the
bubble’s future impact on the economy.4
Returning to the speciﬁcation of our modeling framework, we
next distinguish between two policymakers: a skeptic, who doesn’t
try to second-guess asset-price developments; and an activist, who
4The same rationale applies to our choice of a simple and transparent mod-
eling framework which excludes any forward-looking element to the inﬂation ex-
pectations formation process. Excluding such an element does not imply that the
management of expectations might not be an important tool in the armory of a
central bank deciding how best to handle a growing asset-price bubble. Rather,
it simply reﬂects that our aim in this paper is to highlight other factors which
would—even were such management of future expectations possible—still com-
plicate the task of policymakers trying to determine how to respond optimally to
such a bubble.
8 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
believes that she understands enough about asset-price bubbles to
set policy actively in response to them. To draw the distinction more
precisely, both policymakers understand how the output gap and in-
ﬂation evolve over time, as summarized by equations (4) and (5). The
activist also understands, and responds optimally to, the stochastic
behavior of the bubble, as summarized by equation (3). The skeptic,
by contrast, responds to asset-bubble shocks, ∆at, when they arrive,
but assumes that the expected value of future shocks is zero.
Importantly, such a skeptic should not be thought of as naive or
ignorant for adopting this position. As an asset-price bubble grows,
there is always disagreement about whether the observed asset-price
developments constitute a bubble, in which case expectations about
future asset-price changes may be nonzero, or are instead consistent
with an eﬃcient market, in which case the expected value of future
changes in the asset price is zero.5 In holding that the expected value
of future asset-price shocks is zero, the skeptical policymaker in our
framework should therefore simply be viewed as a believer in the
eﬃcient markets hypothesis.
5In the late 1990s, precisely this debate was occurring within the U.S. Federal
Reserve in relation to the U.S. stock market, as the following quotation from
Stephen Cecchetti makes clear.
From August 1997 to June 1999 I sat on the backbench at the
meetings of the FOMC and received all of the material distributed
to the participants . . . The interesting thing is that during the
period when I took part in this process, the Board staﬀ preparing
the forecasts invariably assumed that the US stock market would
decline signiﬁcantly — 10 to 20 per cent declines in the Wilshire
5000 index were commonly the basis for the forecasts. They clearly
believed that the stock market was overvalued . . .
At the time this was all happening, I confess that I was
scandalised. I regularly ranted about the practice of forecasting
a dramatic decline in the stock market. Like the vast majority
of academics, I adhered to the eﬃcient markets view . . . while we
needed to assume something about the stock market, shouldn’t we
assume the equity index would stay constant at its current level
indeﬁnitely? . . .
This happened ﬁve years ago (which is why I can talk about
it now), and in the interim I have changed many of my views.
(Cecchetti 2003)
The skeptical policymaker in our framework may be characterized as adhering
to the approach of Cecchetti—before his change of view!
Vol. 1 No. 3 Monetary Policy and Asset-Price Bubbles 9
Continuing, we assume that the policymakers observe in each
year whether the bubble has grown further, or collapsed, before
setting the interest rate for that year. Given the nature of the lags
in the model, this year’s interest rate will have no impact on real
activity until next year, and no impact on inﬂation until the year
after that.
We also assume that the two policymakers have the same prefer-
ences, and that they care about the volatility of both inﬂation and
output. Thus we assume that in each year t, policymaker p (activist
or skeptic) sets the real interest rate, rt, to minimize the weighted
sum of the expected future squared deviations of inﬂation and output
from their target levels, or in symbols, sets rt to minimize
L =
∞∑
τ=t+1
[
Ept
(
y2τ
)
+ µEpt
(
π2τ
)]
, (6)
where µ is the relative weight on the deviations of inﬂation and Ept
is the year t expectation of policymaker p. In the results we show in
the paper, we set µ = 1, so that policymakers are assumed to care
equally about deviations of inﬂation from target and output from
potential.
In setting policy each year, the skeptical policymaker ignores the
future stochastic behavior of the bubble. Since certainty-equivalence
holds in the model in this setting, Ball shows that, for the assumed
parameter values, optimal policy takes the form
rt = 1.1yt + 0.8πt, (7)
which is a more aggressive Taylor rule than the “standard” Taylor
rule introduced by Taylor (1993), rt = 0.5yt + 0.5πt.
As the bubble grows, the skeptical policymaker raises the real
interest rate to oﬀset the bubble’s expansionary eﬀects on the econ-
omy. But he does so in an entirely reactive manner, ignoring any
details about the bubble’s future evolution. Once the bubble bursts,
output falls precipitously and the skeptical policymaker eases ag-
gressively, again in line with the dictates of the optimal policy rule,
equation (7).6
6We implicitly assume that the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest
rates is not breached when policy is eased after the bubble bursts, so that the
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We assume that the activist policymaker learns about the bubble
in year 0, and hence takes the full stochastic nature of the bubble
into account when setting the policy rate, rt, from year 0 onward.
Once the bubble bursts, however, there is no further uncertainty in
the model, and the activist policymaker simply follows the modiﬁed
Taylor rule, equation (7), just like the skeptical policymaker.
2. Results
In this section, we present optimal policy recommendations through
time, assuming that the bubble survives and grows. Speciﬁcally, for
each period t we compute optimal policy recommendations for both
the skeptic and activist conditional on, ﬁrst, the bubble having sur-
vived to period t, and secondly, actual policy in each prior period
having been set by the skeptic.
We focus on the growth phase of the bubble’s life because it is
of most policy interest, as it generates the most disagreement about
which policy approach is preferable. Once the bubble bursts, by con-
trast, there is general agreement that it is appropriate to ease ag-
gressively to oﬀset the contractionary eﬀects of the bust.7
As for our assumption that the skeptic has actually set policy
in each prior period, our main aim is to compare the optimal policy
recommendations of the skeptic with those of an activist, over a range
of plausible alternative assumptions about the stochastic nature of
the bubble. To do so in a meaningful way, it is necessary that the
two policymakers face an economy in the same state in each year.
Since the current state of the economy depends on previous policy
settings (as well as on the evolution of the bubble), some assumption
along these lines is clearly necessary, and this seems a convenient and
natural choice.
real interest rate can be set as low as required by equation (7). The model can
readily be extended, however, to explore the implications—both for policymakers’
choice of target inﬂation rate and for the operation of policy for a given inﬂation
target—in the event that a ZLB constraint is imposed. In this case, policymakers
who wish to react preemptively to a growing bubble must now take into account
whether their actions might result in them being unable to set the real interest
rate optimally in subsequent periods, whenever the bubble bursts. For a detailed
discussion of this case, see Robinson and Stone (2005).
7For completeness, the appendix shows optimal interest-rate recommendations
both before and after the bursting of the bubble.
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With these two assumptions, we can then meaningfully ask each
year: Given the state of the economy, what are the current optimal
policy recommendations made by the diﬀerent policymakers? The ac-
tivist’s recommendations will depend on the assumptions she makes
about the future possible paths of the bubble, while the skeptic’s will
not, since he assumes that future asset-price shocks have no expected
eﬀects.
2.1 Baseline Results: Policy Cannot Aﬀect the Bubble
We begin with some simple baseline results. For these results, we
assume that the bubble’s direct expansionary eﬀect on output in each
year of its growth is a constant 1 percent (i.e., γt = 1). Figure 1 shows
the optimal policy choices made by the skeptic and two activists. We
focus ﬁrst on the skeptic, and then on the activists.
Figure 1. Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the
Bubble Survives: Policy Has No Eﬀect on the Bubble
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Skeptic
%%
Activist, pt = 0.4
Activist, pt = 0.2
Year
6543210
Note: The skeptic implements policy in each year. Real interest rates are
deviations from neutral.
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Since the skeptic assumes that future asset-price shocks have no
expected eﬀects, he responds to the bubble only when its initial
expansionary eﬀects are manifest in year 1. As time proceeds and the
bubble grows, he sets the policy interest rate in line with equation (7),
which is optimal given his beliefs about future asset-price shocks. Of
course, were the bubble to burst, he would ease immediately (see
appendix for further details).
An activist, deciding on optimal policy in year t, understands
that if the bubble continues to grow, its direct eﬀect on output next
year will be +1 percent, while if it bursts, the direct eﬀect next year
will be −at percent. If the probability of bursting each year is a
constant, p∗, the bubble’s expected direct eﬀect on output next year
is (1− p∗)− p∗at.
Certainty equivalence applies to this baseline version of the
model.8 It follows that the diﬀerence between the policy interest
rates recommended by the activist, ract , and the skeptic, r
sc
t , de-
pends only on their diﬀerent assessments of the expected eﬀect of
the bubble on output next year. With the skeptic assuming that the
bubble will have no expected eﬀect on output next year, it follows
that
ract − rsct = (1− p∗)− p∗at . (8)
Equation (8) implies that the activist will recommend tighter (eas-
ier) policy than the skeptic whenever, in probability-weighted terms,
the expansionary eﬀect on real activity from the bubble surviv-
ing is greater (less) than the contractionary eﬀect from the bubble
collapsing.
For the results shown in ﬁgure 1, we assume that the only dif-
ference between the two activists is that one assesses the prob-
ability that the bubble will burst each year as pt = p∗ = 0.2
8The model setup is more complex than the standard setup in which certainty
equivalence applies. This is because, once the bubble bursts, there are no further
asset-bubble shocks and hence, ex ante, the distribution of shocks is not indepen-
dent through time. It is therefore not straightforward to demonstrate certainty
equivalence. Nevertheless, equation (8) in the text does follow and can be gen-
eralized to allow for alternative parameter values, and for time-varying bubble
growth and/or probabilities of bubble collapse, provided that the evolution of the
bubble remains independent of the actions of the policymakers. The generalized
equation is ract − rsct = β−1[(1− pt+1)γt+1 − pt+1at ] which, in particular, implies
that (ract −rsct ) does not depend on α, λ, or µ. A proof of this equation is provided
in Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2003).
Vol. 1 No. 3 Monetary Policy and Asset-Price Bubbles 13
(the “durable-bubble activist”), while the other assesses it as
pt = p∗ = 0.4 (the “transient-bubble activist”).9
In terms of their optimal policy recommendations, the two ac-
tivists agree that policy should be tighter than the settings chosen
by the skeptic for the ﬁrst couple of years of the bubble’s growth
(including year 0, since that is when they learn about the bub-
ble). Although they disagree about the details, they share the as-
sessment that the continued probable growth of the bubble is a
more important consideration for policy than the bubble’s possible
collapse.
The activists both understand, however, that as time proceeds,
the bubble is getting bigger and the size of the prospective bust
is also getting bigger. As a consequence, if the bubble survives for
more than a year or two, the two activists no longer agree about
whether policy should be tighter or looser than the modiﬁed Taylor-
rule settings chosen by the skeptic. The durable-bubble activist rec-
ommends tighter policy because she assesses the probability of the
bubble bursting to be small, but the transient-bubble activist recom-
mends looser policy because her assessment is that this probability
is larger.
If the bubble survives for long enough, the two activists will again
concur at least in the direction of their policy advice—they will both
recommend looser policy than the skeptic because the possibility of
the by-now-bigger bubble collapsing eventually dominates for them
both.
In this case, then, the policy recommendations of an activist—
and even whether she recommends tighter or looser policy than the
benchmark settings chosen by the skeptic—depend crucially on her
assessment of the probability that the bubble will collapse of its own
accord. This is an important example of the general point that the
activist’s policy advice will depend critically on the detailed assump-
tions she makes about the stochastic properties of the bubble. This
is the central insight of the paper. We now show the relevance of
this insight across a wide range of alternative assumptions about the
bubble’s stochastic behavior.
9Assuming pt = 0.2 implies an average remaining life for the bubble of ﬁve
years, while pt = 0.4 implies an average remaining life of two and one-half
years.
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2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
2.2.1 Policy Aﬀects the Probability That the Bubble Will Burst
An obvious extension to the model is to assume that by setting
tighter policy this year, the policymaker can raise the probability
that the bubble will burst next year.10 For simplicity, we initially
assume a linear relationship between the interest rate and the prob-
ability of the bubble bursting:
pt = p∗ + δ(rt−1 − r∗t−1) . (9)
We assume that δ = 0.1, so that a 1 percentage point rise in the real
interest rate this year raises the probability of the bubble bursting
next year by 0.1, subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1. The
path of interest rates, r∗t , t ≥ 0, is the optimal path chosen by the
skeptical policymaker.11
As before, we assume that the bubble’s direct expansionary eﬀect
on output in each year of its growth is a constant 1 percent (i.e.,
γt = 1). Figure 2 shows the optimal policy recommendations made
by the skeptic and two activists. The two activists again diﬀer only in
their assessment of the bubble’s probability of collapse. Both believe
that this probability is given by equation (9), but the durable-bubble
activist believes that p∗ = 0.2, while the transient-bubble activist
believes that p∗ = 0.4.
The skeptic’s optimal policy proﬁle is the same as in ﬁgure 1,
because he ignores the future stochastic details of the bubble. By
contrast, it is optimal for the activists to recommend tighter policy
10Most of the extensions we examine as part of our sensitivity analysis imply
that certainty equivalence no longer applies to the model (the exceptions are
the bubble that collapses over two or more years and the rational bubble), in
which case the results must be derived by numerical optimization. To simplify the
numerical problems, we assume that if the bubble survives until year 14 (which is
a very unlikely event for all the parameter values we consider), then it bursts with
certainty in that year. For earlier years, this assumption is only relevant for the
policy choices of the activist policymaker. Where numerical solutions are used,
these were obtained using the “Solver” function in Microsoft Excel, which employs
the Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG2) nonlinear optimization algorithm.
These results were also checked using the BFGS algorithm in Gauss.
11We choose the functional form in equation (9) so that, for the benchmark
policy settings chosen by the skeptic, pt = p
∗ for all t. The results generated using
an alternative functional form, pt = p
∗ + δrt−1, are qualitatively very similar to
those shown.
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Figure 2. Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the
Bubble Survives: Policy Aﬀects the Bubble’s
Probability of Bursting
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Note: The probability of the bubble bursting is given by equation (9) with
δ = 0.1. The skeptic implements policy in each year. Real interest rates are
deviations from neutral.
than they would recommend if they had no inﬂuence on the bubble,
as can be seen by comparing the activist proﬁles in ﬁgures 1 and 2.
By tightening somewhat, the activists reduce the probability that
the bubble will grow further and be more disruptive to the economy
when it ultimately bursts. Nevertheless, the optimal policy continues
to depend, sensitively, on the activist’s assessment of the bubble’s
probability of collapse, just as it did when the activists could not
aﬀect the bubble.
It is also of interest to see how the results change when we vary
the sensitivity to interest rates of the bubble’s probability of col-
lapse. For this exercise, we assume a monotonically increasing, but
nonlinear, relationship between interest rates and this probability,
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to avoid a corner-solution problem with the linear form (explained
shortly). The relationship we assume is
pt =
1
1 + ea(rt−1−r
∗
t−1)+b
, (10)
where a = −δ/(p∗(1 − p∗)) and b = ln((1 − p∗)/p∗). For this func-
tional form, pt = p∗ when rt−1 = r∗t−1 and ∂pt/∂(rt−1 − r∗t−1) = δ
when this derivative is evaluated at rt−1 = r∗t−1. These two features
are also features of the linear form, equation (9). The advantage of
the nonlinear form, equation (10), is that, while raising last year’s
interest rate, rt−1, raises the probability that the bubble will burst
this year, pt, it cannot drive that probability to one, as can occur
with the linear form.12
Figure 3 shows a comparison of optimal interest rate recommen-
dations for the skeptic and three activists. The activists assume that
the bubble’s probability of bursting is given by equation (10) with
p∗ = 0.4 (except p14 = 1), but they assume three diﬀerent degrees
of interest-rate sensitivity: δ = 0.1, δ = 0.2, or δ = 0.3.
The pattern of optimal interest rate recommendations is some-
what similar to those in ﬁgures 1 and 2. When the bubble is very
small, the activists all agree that policy should be tighter than the
setting chosen by the skeptic. But this consensus among the activists
evaporates as the bubble gets bigger, and from year 2 onward, ﬁrst
one and then two of the three activists recommend looser policy than
the skeptic, while the activist who believes that the bubble is highly
interest sensitive (δ = 0.3) continues to recommend tighter policy,
at least until year 6.
12It seems implausible that moderate rises in the real interest rate would burst
the bubble with certainty, yet that is an implication of the linear form, equa-
tion (9). Simulations of the linear model with δ > 0.1 do indeed generate this
outcome (results not shown). It is for this reason that we use the nonlinear form
for simulations with δ > 0.1. As argued by Stockton (2003) in comments on this
paper, one could also imagine that the relationship between the bubble’s proba-
bility of collapse and the policy interest rate might be nonmonotonic, with small
interest-rate rises lowering the subsequent probability of collapse. This could oc-
cur if investors came to view potential market gains as larger or more durable
than they had previously believed, were the bubble to survive a modest policy
tightening. This would undoubtedly further complicate the optimal policy rec-
ommendations of an activist.
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Figure 3. Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the
Bubble Survives: Varying the Interest Sensitivity of the
Probability of Bursting
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Activist, δ = 0.1
%
Skeptic
Activist, δ = 0.2
Activist, δ = 0.3
%
Year
6543210
Note: The probability of the bubble bursting is given by equation (10) with
p∗ = 0.4. The skeptic implements policy in each year. Real interest rates
are deviations from neutral.
2.2.2 Allowing for Eﬃciency Losses
A second natural extension is to allow for eﬃciency losses associated
with the bubble. There are two broad ways to motivate the idea of
eﬃciency losses. They can be motivated in terms of the economically
ineﬃcient physical overinvestment that is put in place in response to
asset-price rises that are not based on fundamentals, or in terms of
the damage done to the ﬁnancial system when the bubble bursts.
Either way, it seems plausible that eﬃciency losses rise with the
size of the bubble. To account for these losses, we reformulate the
policy problem as setting rt to minimize
L = Ept [max(aτ )]
κ +
∞∑
τ=t+1
[
Ept
(
y2τ
)
+ Ept
(
π2τ
)]
, (11)
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where we assume that the eﬃciency losses rise either linearly with
the maximum size of the bubble (κ = 1) or with the square of this
maximum size (quadratic case, κ = 2).13 We also assume, as before,
that the relative weight on inﬂation deviations, µ, takes a value of
one. Since the skeptic ignores the bubble, we assume for him that
Esct [max(aτ )]
κ = 0.
Figure 4 shows a comparison of optimal interest rate settings for
the skeptic and three activists. The activists all assume that the
bubble’s probability of bursting is given by equation (10) with
p∗ = 0.4, and with interest-rate sensitivity, δ = 0.2. The ﬁrst activist,
however, makes no allowance for eﬃciency losses, and hence mini-
mizes the standard loss function, equation (6). The second activist
assumes linear eﬃciency losses, while the third assumes quadratic
losses, and so they minimize the loss function, equation (11), assum-
ing appropriate values for κ.
As previous ﬁgures have shown, being able to raise the probability
of the bubble bursting gives an incentive to the activist policymaker
to tighten policy somewhat. Figure 4 shows that taking account of
eﬃciency losses associated with an asset-price bubble raises this in-
centive further, and therefore further raises the optimal interest rate
recommendations of the activist. Moreover, if eﬃciency losses asso-
ciated with the bubble are assumed to rise suﬃciently rapidly with
the maximum size of the bubble, then the incentive for the activist
to recommend tighter policy than the skeptic is a strong one.
2.2.3 Policy Aﬀects the Bubble’s Growth
A further natural extension to the simple version of the model in-
volves assuming that, rather than aﬀecting the probability of the
bubble bursting, the activist policymaker can, by setting tighter pol-
icy this year, reduce the extent of the bubble’s growth next year if it
survives. For the simulations we show for this case, we assume that
13An alternative way to capture these eﬃciency losses would be to leave our
policymakers’ loss function unchanged, and instead allow for additional contrac-
tionary eﬀects on the real economy from the collapse of the bubble, over and
above those implicit in equation (3), with the magnitude of these additional ef-
fects increasing with the maximum size of the bubble. A modeling approach along
these lines was considered in Kent and Lowe (1997)—see, for example, their equa-
tion (1). However, for simplicity we have chosen to incorporate eﬃciency losses
directly into our policymakers’ loss function.
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Figure 4. Real Interest Rate Recommendations While
the Bubble Survives: Allowing for Eﬃciency Losses
Associated with the Bubble
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Note: The probability of the bubble bursting is given by equation (10) with
p∗ = 0.4 and δ = 0.2. The skeptic implements policy in each year. Real
interest rates are deviations from neutral.
pt = p∗ = 0.4 (except p14 = 1) and that
γt = 1− φ(rt−1 − r∗t−1) . (12)
For reasons we discuss shortly, only large values of the parameter φ
generate signiﬁcantly changed behavior by the activist policymaker.
We therefore assume that φ = 1, so that by setting policy 1 percent-
age point higher than the skeptic this year, the bubble’s growth next
year is reduced from 1 percent to nothing.14 As above, the path of
14If the bubble survives, it would again be necessary to set policy 1 percentage
point higher than the skeptic to ensure that the bubble did not grow in the
subsequent year. Given the eﬀects of continually tight policy on the rest of the
economy, it is perhaps not surprising that being able to raise the probability that
the bubble will burst has more inﬂuence on optimal policy than simply being able
to reduce its growth each year by setting tighter policy in each previous year.
20 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
Figure 5. Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the
Bubble Survives: Policy Aﬀects the Bubble’s Growth
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
%%
Year
6543210
Skeptic
Activist, bubble
growth fixed
Activist, policy affects
bubble growth
Note: The probability of the bubble bursting is pt = 0.4. The skeptic imple-
ments policy in each year. Real interest rates are deviations from neutral.
interest rates deﬁned by r∗t , t ≥ 0, is the optimal path chosen by the
skeptical policymaker assuming γt = 1.
Figure 5 shows a comparison of optimal interest rate recommen-
dations for the skeptic and two activists. Both activists assume that
the bubble’s growth is given by equation (12), but one assumes no
interest-rate sensitivity, φ = 0, while the other assumes high sensi-
tivity, φ = 1.15
For every year apart from year 0, being able to reduce the
bubble’s growth induces the activist policymaker to recommend
tighter policy than she otherwise would. The diﬀerences in the
policy recommendations induced by this expectation are, however,
less pronounced than the diﬀerences that arise when an activist
15The results assuming no interest-rate sensitivity are equivalent to the baseline
results shown in ﬁgure 1 for the activist assuming pt = 0.4.
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policymaker assesses the probability that the bubble will burst each
year at pt = 0.2 rather than pt = 0.4, as can be seen by comparing
ﬁgures 1 and 5.
2.2.4 Bubbles That Take Two or More Years to Collapse
Another extension to the basic model involves assuming that, when
the bubble collapses, it does so evenly over two or more years, rather
than suddenly in one. In the examples we have examined until now,
the activist must always confront the problem that, owing to the
lag structure of the Ball-Svensson model, policy can only respond to
a collapsing bubble after the collapse is complete. This problem is
reduced by assuming that the collapse occurs over two or more years
rather than one.
Figure 6 shows results for the skeptic and two activists (one
who assumes gradual, even, two-year collapse; the other, sudden),
Figure 6. Real Interest Rate Recommendations While the
Bubble Survives: Bubble Takes Two Years to Collapse
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Note: The probability of the bubble bursting is pt = 0.4. The skeptic imple-
ments policy in each year. Real interest rates are deviations from neutral.
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assuming that pt = p∗ = 0.4 (except p14 = 1) and that γt = 1. The
activist who assumes that the bubble will collapse only gradually
recommends tighter policy than the one who assumes that it will
be sudden, because of their diﬀerent assessments of the bubble’s
expected eﬀect on next year’s output.
Nevertheless, the overall pattern of policy recommendations re-
mains similar to earlier cases. As the size of the bubble grows, the
“gradually bursting” activist eventually recommends looser policy
than the skeptic does, for reasons that are by now familiar.
In cases in which the bubble is expected to collapse evenly over
three or more years, the activist would recommend tighter policy
than the skeptic for longer, while the bubble is growing, a result
that follows from a straightforward extension to equation (8).
2.2.5 A Rational Bubble
In the baseline results presented at the beginning of the section, we
assumed that the asset-price bubble grew at a uniform rate, γt = 1,
and that the probability of the bubble’s collapse was constant
through time. This seems to us a simple and intuitively appealing
baseline case.
In this case, however, there is no arbitrage condition ruling out
unexploited proﬁt opportunities in the assets whose price rises con-
stitute the bubble. Our baseline case is therefore not a “rational”
bubble. We do not see this as a shortcoming—to our minds, there
is much evidence that the asset-price bubbles we see in modern in-
dustrial economies are not rational in this sense (see, for example,
Shiller 2000). Nevertheless, it is of interest to derive results for the
case of a rational bubble.
Such a bubble arises from the actions of a rational investor who
buys the relevant assets up to the point at which expected proﬁts
are driven to zero.16
If the probability of collapse is constant, p∗, and the capital
gain to the investor in year t + 1 if the bubble collapses is −at,
then a rational risk-neutral investor will be indiﬀerent to holding
the asset when the expected growth of the bubble, if it survives,
16We assume that the assets yield an annual return equal to the real interest
rate, so that the expected proﬁt relative to holding one-year government bonds
is determined by the expected capital gain on the assets.
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is ∆at+1 = atp∗/(1 − p∗). This is a geometrically growing bubble,
rather than the constant-growth bubble that constituted our base-
line case.17
The arbitrage condition that deﬁnes this rational bubble implies
that the bubble’s expected growth over the next year, Eact ∆at+1, is
zero. In this case, however, the activist and the skeptic are making
identical assumptions about the bubble’s expected eﬀect on next
year’s output. It follows that the activist will always recommend
the same policy interest rate as the skeptic for a rational bubble,
provided she believes that the stochastic properties of the bubble
are not aﬀected by the actions of policymakers, so that certainty
equivalence holds.18
This result for a rational bubble is interesting in its own right.
However, it suggests another possible critique of our earlier choice of
baseline bubble. This critique runs as follows.
An activist policymaker in our model economy, observing what
she believes to be a developing asset-price bubble, must think the
assets in question to be overvalued or they would not constitute a
bubble. In this case, however, she would presumably always expect
the probability-weighted value of the change in asset prices next pe-
riod to be negative, while the bubble survives. Yet then, in view
of the generalization of equation (8) discussed in footnote 8, such
an activist would always (at least for an exogenous bubble) recom-
mend looser policy than a skeptic while such a bubble was grow-
ing. This, however, would run counter to the central thrust of our
earlier results—that the direction in which an activist approach to
responding to asset-price bubbles would shift policy is not uniform,
and depends sensitively on the detailed stochastic properties of the
bubble.
17Note that, if the probability of collapse is not constant, a rational bubble
need not grow at a constant geometrical rate.
18This result relies on a number of implicit, simplifying assumptions about the
economy. In particular, it relies on the assumptions that the eﬀect on the output
gap of changes in asset prices is proportional to the size of those changes, and
that rational investors and the activist policymaker agree on the exact stochastic
details of the bubble. Relaxing either of these assumptions could generate diﬀerent
policy recommendations by the activist. For example, for a geometrically growing
bubble, it could account for an activist policymaker assessing the bubble’s growth
rate to be faster (slower) than “rational”—say, ∆at+1 = χatp
∗/(1 − p∗), with
χ > 1 (χ < 1)—in which case the activist’s policy recommendations would always
be tighter (looser) than the skeptic’s for as long as the bubble survived.
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Fortunately for our analysis, we believe there is a ﬂaw in this
chain of reasoning. The critical link is the presumption that, if an
activist policymaker believes asset prices to be currently overvalued,
she will necessarily judge the expected value of the change in these
prices next period to be negative. We do not believe this need be so.
Speciﬁcally, such an activist may regard the current level of as-
set prices as irrational, in the sense of having become unmoored from
fundamentals, yet still judge it likely that these prices will continue
to rise next period, with suﬃcient probability to make the bub-
ble’s expected excess return next period positive. Such an assess-
ment merely requires a view that enough market participants do
not yet share her view as to the overvaluation of the relevant asset
prices—together with a belief, which the empirical evidence would
seem to support, that asset-price misalignments can often persist for
extended periods.19 As such, a bubble process along the lines of our
baseline bubble seems to us quite a natural and plausible benchmark
from which to have begun our analysis in this section.
3. Discussion
As discussed at the outset, there are two competing schools of
thought in the literature regarding the appropriate response of mon-
etary policy to asset-price bubbles. The ﬁrst, often associated with
Bernanke and Gertler (2000), argues that monetary policy should
only respond to observed changes in asset prices to the extent that
they signal current or future changes to inﬂation or the output gap.
The second, advanced by Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003),
argues that raising interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above
what are estimated to be warranted levels can reduce the eﬀects
19This point can be strikingly illustrated by considering the case of a pyramid
scheme, for which there may be no underlying assets whatsoever. An observer
who becomes aware of such a scheme in its early stages need not necessarily con-
clude that it will collapse next period, even though there is no doubt that it is
fundamentally irrational. Rather, it may be perfectly rational to expect that such
a scheme will continue to grow for several periods, until enough people become
wary of its unsustainable nature that it suddenly fails some time down the track.
For a detailed model in which it may be rational for speculators to buy into a
market which they understand to be experiencing a bubble, see DeLong et al.
(1990). More generally, regarding the distinction in our setting between policy-
makers’ assessments of asset-price developments and those of market participants,
see also the earlier discussion in footnote 18.
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Table 1. Activist’s Policy Recommendations
While the Bubble Survives
Scenario Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Policy can’t aﬀect bubble
pt = 0.2 + + + = − −
pt = 0.4 + − − − − −
Policy aﬀects probability
of bursting
p∗ = 0.2, δ = 0.1 + + + + + +
p∗ = 0.4, δ = 0.1 + + − − − −
p∗ = 0.4, δ = 0.2 + + + − − −
p∗ = 0.4, δ = 0.3 + + + + + −
Linear eﬃciency losses + + + − − −
Quadratic eﬃciency losses + + + + + +
Policy aﬀects bubble + + − − − −
growth
Bubble bursts over two + + + − − −
periods
Rational bubble = = = = = =
Key: Tighter (+), looser (−), or the same as (=) the skeptic’s
recommendation
of asset-price bubbles on output and inﬂation, thereby enhancing
macroeconomic stability.
Our paper does not resolve this debate. However, the results of
our simulations do serve to highlight the information required to
successfully implement activist policy, thereby bringing the debate
closer to the policy arena. These results are summarized in table 1.
For each set of assumptions, this table shows, as time proceeds and
the bubble grows, whether the activist in our model setting would
recommend tighter (+), looser (−), or the same (=) policy settings
as the skeptic.
There are several broad lessons worth highlighting from this sum-
mary. When the asset-price bubble is small enough, the activist
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policymaker always (except in the case of the rational bubble) recom-
mends tighter policy than the skeptic who ignores the future possible
paths of the bubble. However, this result is of limited practical rel-
evance. Although we have assumed that activist policymakers learn
about the nature of the bubble at its inception, in reality there is
likely to be much doubt in the early stages about whether rising asset
prices constitute a bubble. Asset-price bubbles rarely arise out of thin
air—instead, they usually occur when the evolving economic funda-
mentals are consistent with some rise in asset prices. While there
will always be some doubt about whether rising asset prices con-
stitute a bubble, these doubts would seem particularly acute when
the suspected deviation of asset prices from fundamentals remains
small and has been short-lived. For these reasons, there would seem
to be no strong case for central banks to respond to small asset-price
misalignments.20
As the bubble grows, however, there are two developments with
potentially conﬂicting implications for appropriate activist policy.
On the one hand, an activist policymaker should become increasingly
conﬁdent that the observed asset-price rises do constitute a bubble,
which should strengthen the case for responding actively to them. On
the other hand, as the bubble grows, the potential negative eﬀects
from its eventual bursting will increase. Whether this constitutes an
argument for tighter or looser policy will depend on the nature of
the bubble.
The case for tightening is to oﬀset the expansionary eﬀects of
future expected growth of the bubble and, in some formulations, to
reduce the bubble’s growth or help to burst it. As we have seen, there
are circumstances in which this case is particularly compelling—in
particular, when the probability that the bubble will burst of its
own accord over the next year is assessed to be small, the bub-
ble’s probability of bursting is quite interest sensitive, eﬃciency
losses associated with the bubble rise strongly with the bubble’s
size, or the bubble’s demise is expected to occur gradually over an ex-
tended period, rather than in a sudden bust. Conversely, the case for
20Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003, 440) also make this point when
they say, “Our proposal [to raise interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above
what are estimated to be warranted levels] does not call for central banks to
respond to small misalignments. We agree that these are diﬃcult to detect and
are unlikely to have very strong destabilizing eﬀects in any case.”
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loosening is strongest when these conditions are reversed, since in
those circumstances it becomes increasingly important to allow for
the contractionary impact that arises when the bubble bursts.21 The
stochastic process driving the bubble is thus crucial to determining
which of these considerations predominates.22
4. Conclusions
The appropriate strategy for policymakers faced with an asset-price
bubble depends sensitively on the stochastic properties of the bubble,
which highlights the stringent informational requirements inherent in
an activist approach. Where suﬃcient information about the bubble
process is not available to policymakers, a robust approach, some-
thing along the lines of the standard inﬂation-targeting approach
used by our skeptic, may be the best that can be achieved. Given
suﬃcient information about the bubble process, an activist approach
may be feasible, but our results suggest that the appropriate response
to bubbles is not uniform. In particular, it may be optimal to “lean
against” some bubbles but not others, and hence the formulation of
an activist strategy requires judgments to be made about the process
driving the bubble and its likely sensitivity to monetary policy.
21In a passage immediately following the one quoted in the previous footnote,
Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) say, “. . . There are clearly times when
egregious misalignments exist. Recent examples include Japanese stock and land
prices in 1989, and the NASDAQ in late 1999 and early 2000. While some por-
tion of these high price levels may have been justiﬁable based on fundamentals,
few people would deny that a signiﬁcant component was due to asset market
disturbances. Ultimately, in terms of reducing inﬂation and output volatility, it
is important that central bankers respond to these large relatively ‘obvious’ mis-
alignments.” (p. 440, italics added) When misalignments are large and relatively
obvious, however, our results suggest that it may be unclear whether the appro-
priate policy response is to raise interest rates modestly or to lower them, unless
the policymaker has speciﬁc knowledge about the stochastic process driving the
bubble.
22It is also possible that the probability of the bubble bursting of its own accord
over the next year might rise as the bubble gets larger. If so, the case for looser,
rather than tighter, policy by the activist is further strengthened, a point also
made by Kent and Lowe (1997). For most of our simulations, we have assumed
p∗ = 0.4, implying an average remaining life for the bubble of two and one-half
years, which may be a more plausible assumption for intermediate and larger
bubbles than p∗ = 0.2, which implies an average remaining life of ﬁve years.
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Appendix. Policy Settings for a Bubble That Bursts in the
Fifth Year
We assume a constant probability pt = 0.2 that the bubble bursts
in each year. In contrast to the simulations reported in the text, we
allow both the skeptic and the activist to implement policy through
time—so that the state of the economy depends on the identity of
the policymaker. Figure 7 shows results assuming that, as events
turn out, the bubble grows for four years, during which time it has
Figure 7. Results for Bubble That Happens to Burst in
the Fifth Year
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a direct expansionary eﬀect on output of γ = 1 percent in each year,
and then bursts in the ﬁfth year, with a direct contractionary eﬀect
on output of 4 percent in that year.23 The top panel shows the real
interest-rate proﬁles, rt, set by the two policymakers; the second
and third panels show the outcomes for the output gap, yt, and the
inﬂation rate, πt.
While the bubble is growing, the paths for output and inﬂation
generated by the skeptic’s policy settings reﬂect the continued ex-
pansionary eﬀects of the bubble. The activist responds more aggres-
sively to these expansionary eﬀects because she anticipates them, but
nevertheless she does not oﬀset them completely because of the pos-
sibility that the bubble may be about to burst. Therefore, even with
the activist’s optimal policy settings, output and inﬂation remain
above target while the bubble survives.
The bursting of the bubble in year 5 generates a severe reces-
sion. Output falls by more than the direct contractionary eﬀect of
the bubble bursting, because policy in the previous year has been
tighter than neutral to oﬀset the bubble’s expansionary eﬀects. In
response to the bubble’s collapse, policy is eased aggressively. De-
spite using the same policy rule after the bubble bursts—namely the
modiﬁed Taylor rule, equation (7)—the paths for the policy interest
rate, output, and inﬂation are somewhat diﬀerent for the two policy-
makers because they have set diﬀerent policy interest rates in earlier
years.
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